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In a typical book review, I would look for and examine what is new about a partic-
ular thinker’s idea or presentation. However, as I read Th e Cambridge Companion 
to Dewey I fi nd that I cannot and should not use the same criteria for evaluation. 
I pick up a Cambridge Companion when I need an introduction or a refresher on 
material—not when I need to see what the cutting-edge scholarship is. Th at being 
said, a companion ought not propagate the status quo or fail to communicate what 
is current in the understanding of a fi gure or an area.  Th erefore, a companion 
ought, fi rst, to provide an adequate introduction to a literate, but inexpert, person 
to the fi eld it purports to introduce. Second, a companion should show the diver-
sity of thought about a subject—what are the controversies and various thoughts 
about a fi gure that one might encounter. I do not expect every heterodox reading of 
a fi gure, but I would desire to know various understandings of that fi gure. Finally, 
a companion should impart the tools to start independent research on the fi gure 
in question. With this in mind, I  turn to Th e Cambridge Companion to Dewey. 
Robert Westbrook’s biographical chapter is accessible and informative. His 
discussion of the role of Dewey’s fi rst wife Alice and his political awareness in Chi-
cago is instructive on how deeply democratic social life informs Dewey’s thought.
Ruth Anna Putnam’s contribution to the volume is laudatory. While using 
the general language of contemporary philosophy, she dissolves many of the prob-
lems analytic philosophers might have in interpreting Dewey’s language. It is also 
noteworthy that Putnam acknowledges Dewey’s similarities and indebtedness to 
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Peirce in regard to the theory of truth—the agreement of all possible inquirers aft er 
all possible inquiry. Putnam, further, does an admirable job of showing how Dewey 
does not fall into the opposing schools of realism or antirealism, instead presenting 
Dewey’s  philosophy of experience. Dewey’s theory of inquiry is not simply another 
epistemological category but a unifying activity that brings together all parts of in-
quisitive activity—including ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology.
Richard M. Gale provides a highly critical chapter suggesting that Dewey’s 
naturalism is a distinctly humanistic variety of naturalism that seeks to set up a 
near-Hegelian, completely continuous metaphysical monism in which the organism 
and environment collapse together. Gale suggests this is a version of claiming that 
naturalism of Dewey’s sort “depict[s] nature as made for us human beings because 
it answers back to our deepest feelings and aspirations” (55). Gale understands 
Dewey’s naturalism to hold that all of nature is continuous and that our interac-
tion with it as organisms is wholly aesthetic with cognition as an immanent quality 
(even accusing Dewey of scholasticism by claiming that Dewey holds that inquiry is 
immanent in all matter because an eff ect cannot have more reality than its cause). 
Isaac Levi also contributes a critical chapter on Dewey’s theory of inquiry. Levi 
presents Dewey’s theory of inquiry against Peirce’s theory of fi xing belief—pointing 
out that Peirce’s theory allows for the fi xation of belief in irrational, but all too hu-
man, manners that have more explanatory power. Levi’s concern is that doubt can 
be settled by means other than inquiry. Th is criticism of Deweyan inquiry arises 
from Dewey’s commitment that all problematic situations ought to be brought to 
determinacy by inquiry. Th is would imply, on Levi’s reading, that whenever a be-
lief is formed the inquirer should play that belief out to all its logical consequences 
(88). Levi’s overall point is that there are, when we investigate the problems of life 
as opposed to the problems of philosophers, many (oft en successful) means of fi x-
ing belief.  Further, Levi suggests a reconstruction of Dewey’s thought where we 
understand belief as commitment to a point of view.  
J. E. Tiles argues that Dewey’s philosophy takes James’s radical empiricism as 
a starting point and expands his philosophy of experience to include not only the 
possibility of experience as an interaction of organism and environment, but also 
recognizes that experience occurs consciously and subconsciously (102-03). Tiles 
adequately and clearly presents Dewey’s position that logic is the study of inquiry 
and that inquiry is always empirical. 
Mark Johnson seeks to show that Dewey’s philosophy is a nonreductive natu-
ralistic philosophy of mind that accords with contemporary neuroscience. Johnson 
argues that Dewey’s breakdown of the mind/body dualism agrees with contem-
porary neuroscience (127) and provides a meaningful and important manner in 
which to talk about mind as an achievement of embodied inquirers (126). Johnson 
rightly states, “mind emerges when symbolic interaction and sharing of mean-
ings becomes possible for a group of creatures” (128).  While Johnson shows how 
an organism in an environment functionalizes “mind,” he is careful to do so in a 
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nonreductive manner. Johnson argues that situations are always “saturated with 
feeling, meaning, and interest” (133) and demonstrates the import of Dewey to 
contemporary neuroscience.
Matthias Jung argues that the work of Dewey can help to illuminate obscurity 
between the dichotomous camps of rationalist action theorists who seek to describe 
how thought eff ects activity and those empiricists who seek to show how activity can 
take place in a situation. Both these camps leave out important factors of activity. 
Jung writes: “Emphasizing the importance of situation, corporeality, and sociality, 
against . . . tacit assumptions of both normative and rational choice theories of ac-
tion, the pragmatists, especially John Dewey, off er an alternative” (147). Jung sees 
Dewey’s rejection of the refl ex arc as a legitimate description of activity and ap-
plauds Dewey’s a theory of embodiment (154). Th e essay concludes by describing the 
benefi ts of Dewey’s theory of mind for cognitive science and artifi cial intelligence.
Jennifer Welchman’s contribution to the volume is a valuable introduction to 
the oft en cryptic and confusing world of pragmatic ethics. Dewey rejects universal 
or rational principles and introduces a socially embedded, practical, and situational 
ethics. Understanding that “all practical judgment is functional or instrumental,” 
Welchman argues that there is a diff erence between what is valued and what is a 
warranted valuation (172). While values are what is simply prized or desired, valua-
tions are those values that are judged as important in a moral situation. Importantly, 
Welchman emphasizes the inherently and unavoidably social aspects of ethical 
deliberation (176) and the pluralistic moral factors involved in moral deliberation 
(179). She cites the pluralistic moral philosophy of “Th ree Independent Factors in 
Morals” and concludes that the moral life is not guided by any one principle but is 
rather a form of “pluralistic welfare consequentialism” (182).  
In a very helpful contribution to this volume, James Bohman argues that “the 
purpose of Dewey’s naturalistic ethics is not merely descriptive, but ameliorative: 
he seeks to improve moral judgments and make them suitable to . . . new social 
circumstances” (187). Dewey’s moral theorizing lacks a focus on rendering activ-
ity consistent with some a priori or dogmatic norm but instead seeks to improve 
the meaning of lived situations. Especially helpful is Bohman’s exposition of moral 
inquiry as a dynamic change of habits. Bohman is careful to avoid an individualist 
or collectivist account of how habits are developed in a social milieu. Bohman sees 
Dewey’s “contextualism as a solution to a number of skeptical diffi  culties of moral 
philosophy,” understanding moral problems as practical, not theoretical, problems 
(199). Dewey’s work is thus rendered an important tool for changing concrete prob-
lematic situations.
Sami Pihlström presents Dewey’s mature religious thought in A Common 
Faith. Dewey’s religious philosophy argues that there is a religious experience with-
out making dogmatic or empirically unfounded claims which are forwarded by 
various individual religions. Dewey’s insight that “the religious aspect of experience 
can be appreciated without metaphysical commitments of anything supernatural” 
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(211) is strengthened by Pihlström’s careful consideration of Dewey’s nonreductive 
naturalism, his commitment to an ethics of growth, and his straddling of realism 
and antirealism. Pihlström argues that “Dewey’s pragmatic ‘instrumentalism’ . . 
. accommodates an intriguing tension between standard realisms and antireal-
isms” (221).  Dewey’s constructivism maintains “that objects are not independent 
of inquiry but pragmatically constructions arising out of an intelligent use of the 
methods of inquiry” (223). Th us Dewey is a realist (of a sort) insofar as he rejects 
“unnatural doubts about the reality of theoretical entities” and accepts “whatever the 
religiously inclined ‘inquirer’ fi nds necessary to postulate within her/his genuinely 
religious experience” (224). Pihlström concludes his essay with some informative 
work on how Dewey compares to his various contemporary religious naturalists.  
Richard Eldridge contributes a chapter on Dewey’s philosophy of art, dis-
cussing contributions of this philosophy to Dewey’s overall project. Eldridge, citing 
Art as Experience, outlines the various arguments Dewey gives to explain that aes-
thetic experience leads to a philosophy of “organic interrelatedness” (246). Eldridge 
concludes his chapter by noting the criticisms of Dewey’s overall project but also 
holds that “if we are to have any chance of living and meaning fully, intensely, and 
more adequately than we now do, then we shall have to imagine better modalities 
of life constructively” (260). Eldridge argues that Dewey’s thought contributes to 
the imaginative manners that we can employ to construct our realities—and art 
is one good way to give “material embodiment to initiator-provoked, imaginative 
visions of human possibility” (261).  
Nel Noddings provides what she calls an “appreciative critique” of Dewey’s 
theory of education from the perspective of care ethics (265). Noddings fi nds that 
“care theory is largely compatible with Dewey’s philosophy of education” (285). 
Her criticisms of Dewey focus mostly on omissions in Dewey’s work on education 
or on topics where Dewey does not take his observation that education should be 
about experience deeply enough to incorporate the experience of women and those 
who fi nd themselves forced to do mundane and oft en repetitive work. Noddings 
holds that care ethics provides an adequate expansion on what she understands 
to be omissions in Dewey’s philosophy. By focusing on the dyadic relationship of 
cared-for and care-giver, Noddings hold that many of Dewey’s omissions and vague 
points can be corrected. Noddings raises fair points about some of Dewey’s explicit 
omissions and her “appreciative criticism” will only, I believe, increase the broad 
applicability of pragmatic philosophy.
Richard J. Bernstein contributes a helpful chapter on Dewey’s democratic 
faith. Arguing that Dewey did not believe democracy to be simply a form of gov-
ernment where atomic individuals come together into a mass which becomes the 
sovereign majority. Instead, Bernstein rightly argues, Dewey’s democratic faith is 
placed in a social ethos that recognizes that rich social ties and interactions con-
stitute the dynamic creation of majorities. Th is vision of democracy has room for 
legitimate experts and does not fall into the mob rule of the demos. Bernstein con-
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tinually emphasizes that Dewey’s democratic theory is a social theory. Further, this 
contribution to the volume discusses the complex relationship Dewey has to com-
munitarians on one side and liberals on the other.  
In the fi nal chapter of this volume, Molly Cochran argues that Dewey’s work 
has contemporary infl uence in the fi eld of international relations. While discussing 
Dewey’s shift ing views on war, the outlawing of war, and international governance, 
Cochran argues that Dewey’s vision of democracy, publics, and rejection of the 
Westphalian conception of states is important for contemporary studies of inter-
national relations. Dewey thus foreshadows the shift  to normative approaches in 
international relations. Cochran concludes that Dewey’s emphasis on the humanity 
of individuals and faith in the potential of education to form democratic publics is 
signifi cant for contemporary discussions.
Overall, this volume satisfi es the goals of the Cambridge Companion series. 
However the volume lacks a thoroughgoing discussion of Dewey’s philosophy of 
education—Noddings’ essay is good, but not suffi  cient for an explication of Dew-
ey’s role in progressive education and continuing infl uence in educational theory. I 
would also like to see more essays on Dewey’s democratic theory, philosophy of art, 
and philosophy of technology. However, despite these omissions, the volume will 
satisfy many readers. Th ose new to Dewey’s work will fi nd several signifi cant start-
ing points where their own research into Dewey can begin and seasoned scholars 
will fi nd the essays from well regarded philosophers helpful in their own projects. 
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